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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
:JIUD CONTROL LABORATORIES,
INC,. A Corporation,
Appellant)
vs.

Case No.
8025

THERON S. COVEY, et al,
Respondents and
Cross-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENTOFFACTS
The statement of facts in Appellant's brief is generally accurate and satisfactory to Respondents and
Cross-Appellants. The Appellant has limited its appeal
to the question of interstate commerce which makes abstracting the record almost superfluous.
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The finding-~ of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
carefully considered by counsel and the trial court and
,, .... , tiiPrPJ'ore, limit our additional statement of facts on
t liP i~~uP~ rai~ed by the Appellant to quoting from Finding~ of I~\wt 13 and 16, which are partially covered at
page~ ;> and () of Appellant's brief. In addition to the
mattt·r~ stated by Appellant these findings state that
~. J. Putnan1 had authority to solicit business from new
customers, subject to approval of the home office; that
a quantity of supplies were kept on the L. N. Liscombe
property at \~ernal, l~tah, from which sales were made
to a large number of customers; that Putnam's office
was on the same premises where he had a laboratory for
doing experimental work connected with the use of Appellant's products (see Exhibit 10); that Appellant paid
for a telephone in \~ernal, L~tah, had its sign at the entrance of the Liscombe premises and on Putnam's car;
that all products sold at 'Ternal, Utah, were sold at the
same price to each customer without discount and that
billing was done from Appellant's office in Oklahoma
City where the computation of prevailing market price
was 1nade and shown on the delivery ticket and invoice
sent to the purchaser (R. 241). All of Appellant's products were put up in packages suitable for shipping and
in appropriate size, Inaterial and shape for direct use
from the packages ( R. 242).
FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL
Respondents have filed notice of Cross-Appeal (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
:2-l-9) and have designated certain points to be considered
on Cro~s-Appeal (R. :250).
The Findings of Fact refer to the joint operating
agreement and recite that the well was drilled in accordance therewith and that certain pipe was furnished hy
Respondents referred to in the agreement. .M. E. Baird
and H. L. Robbins were co-partners operating as Baird
and Robbins Drilling Company and under such narne
jointly with Respondents the well was drilled (R. 239).
rrhe joint operating agreen1ent authorized Baird and
Robbins to utilize the services of a corporation to be
wholly owned by them and on or about December 26,
1948, said persons formed "Baird and Robbins Drilling
Company, Inc." the affairs of which corporation were
conducted in such manner as to make it a fraud and a
fiction with no separateness frmn the partnership or
the individuals. Appellant, in selling and delivering the
products involved in this lawsuit "did not rely upon the
separate and independent credit of the defendants Covey"
(R. 240).
Sales in Utah frmn the Vernal warehouse prior to
qualification in lTtah were substantial and numerous
(R. -l-7).
The joint operating agreement is :B~xhibit C, and
contains the following provisions deemed material to
the Cross-Appeal on the question whether a mining partnership existed between Baird and Robbins, or their
partnership, or their corporation and the Respondentf'.

"THIS AGRgFJl\1ENT, entered into this 5th
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
day of January, 1949, by and between M. E. Baird
and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, with their prineipal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and
Hybil 'r. Baird, wife of M. E. Baird, first parties,
hereinafter called 'operator,' and S. M. Covey,
A. A. Covey, H. 'r. Covey, S. U. Covey, T. S. Covey
and F. K. Gilroy, hereinafter called 'Coveys,'
second parties, hereinafter collectively called 'nonoperators.'
I.

CONSIDERATION
A.

Non-operators agree to pay first parties the smn of Sixteen Thousand Dollars ($16,000.00) as follows: Eight
Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) concurrently with the following and Eight
Thousand Dollars ( $8,000.00) upon the
commencement of the drilling the first
well as described in paragraph IV
herein:

C.

Non-operators further agree to purchase pipe of a description hereafter
to be agreed upon by the parties at a
cost of not to exceed Seven Thousand,
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00),
which pipe shall be owned by Coveys
and available subject to the conditions
hereinafter set forth. Coveys agree
to deliver their checks, payable to
owner and seller of said pipe, from
whom operator agrees to obtain bill
of sale to said pipe, in favor of the
second parties.
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II.

EFFEC'rlYE PERIOD
This ag-reentent is to rentain in force
for the full tenn of any and all of the
leases or agreentenb as heretofore described and of any renewals or extensions thereof, whether by production
or otherwise. It is expressly understood and agreed between the parties
hereto that by these presents the first
parties have transferred to the Second
parties twelve per cent ( 12o/o) of the
one hundred per cent (100%) interest.

III.

POSSESION OF OPERATOR
A.

Operator shall have the sole right of
prospecting and exploring the lands,
subject to this agreement, and drilling
for, producing, storing, transporting
and removing oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances, frmn the lands, subject to this agreernent, and the injection of water, other fluids or gas into
the lands, subject to this agreement,
together with the right, subject to the
terms of the several leases herein described, to establish, maintain and repair on the lands or to remove therefront tanks, boilers, buildings, machiner~· and other apparatus or equipment, pipe lines, pole lines, power
lines, telephone and telegraph lines,
rods and other appurtenances which
rnay be necessary or convenient in the
production, treahuent, storage or
transportation of oil, gas or other hydro-carbon substances on or from the
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lands as may be necessary for the purposes of operating and carrying out
the terms, provisions and purposes
of this agreement.
B.

IY.

'fhe number of employees, the selection of such employees, the hours of
labor and compensation for services to
be paid any and all such employees
shall be solely at the discretion and
determination of the operator and
such employees shall be the employees
of the operator and under its sole direction and orders.

DEVELOP~lENT

A.

OF WELL ONE

Operator agrees to drill a well on the
land described in paragraph 1 of 'Descriptions' and at a location on said
land determined by the operator and
to commence the drilling of said well
on or before the first day of February,
1949. The Sixteen Thousand Dollars
($16,000) hereinbefore named and paid
to the first parties shall be used by
the operator for payment of drilling
and development charges in connection with the drilling of said well and
no part of any costs or expenses for
the drilling of said well or the maintenance of this lease, such as the payment of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) as rental charge (should the payment of the same be necessary to continue said lease in full force and effect) shall be charged or be a claim
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7
upon the second parties. In thP event
said wpll shall be a dn' hole, no costs,
including ('O~b of abandonment, shall
be a clai1n against second parties. If
said well produces oil or gas in comInereial quantities, all of the development costs and expenses, including
but not li1nited to, drilling, casing, tubing, rods, pumping equipment, well
head connections, separators and
tanks, incurred by operator in connection with the drilling and equipment
of said well for production, shall be
borne and paid for exclusively by
operator.
B.

Operator shall conduct its operation
in a good and work1nanlike 1nanner
and in accordance with good oil field
practice. If operator so desires it may
mnploy its own tools and equip1nent
in the drilling of said well or it may
en1ploy the services of a corporation
wholly owned by operator in which
event it is understood said corporation
shall have no claim against the second
parties, nor any lien against said leasehold or any oil, g·as or other hydrocarbon substance-s produced on or
from the lands.

C.

Operator herehy agrees and undertakes to provide a corporate surety
bond in the sum of not less than Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), pro-

'1.

~-
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tecting, holding harmless and indemnifying the second parties from all
adH or failures to act in connection
with fi r~t parties' operations or its
contracting parties under this agreement, which bond shall he filed with
Hecond parties.

\.I.

DEVI£LOP~IENT

AND DISCOVERY

All drilling and development by the
operator shall be conducted in a good
and workmanlike manner, in accordance with good oil field practice. All
drilling and development charges, except for the first well as hereinbefore
described, shall be charged to the joint
account of the parties hereto under the
terms and conditions described herein and as described in the accounting
procedure attached hereto and marked
'Exhibit B' and hereby made a part
hereof, on the basis of two per cent
(2%) to each of the Coveys, constituting twelve per cent (12%) as nonoperators and eighty-eight per cent
(88%) to operator.

VII.

APPROVAL OF OPERATIONS
NON-OPERATORS.
A.

BY

The written approval of non-operators
shall be required
1.

For the abandonment of any well
which has produced oil or gas in
commercial quantities for a period of thirty (30) days.
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For any capital expenditure of
operator in any sum in excess of
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) for which non-operators will
be expected to pay their share of
the costs in cash, except that the
written consent by non-operators
of the drilling of any well shall be
construed to rnean approval of
all necessary expenditures in drilling, completing and equipping
such well, including the necessary
lease tankage.
9

t),

For the sale and disposition of
surplus materials and equipment
by operator, it being understood
that all equipment, facilities and
structures purchased on account
of the joint operation of the parties hereto (except all such equipment, facilities and structures
placed on or nwved on the described prernises hy operator for
the drilling of the first well as
herein described shall he prestuned to be the property of the
owner until non-owner shall prove
differently. 'rhereafter all property purchased shall be presumed
to be joint property until opera tor shall prove differently.) shall
be owned eighty-eight per cent
(88%) by operator, twelve per
cent ( 1=Z(?~) hy second parties.
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B.

The following specific rights, pnVIleges and obligations of non-operators,
and each of them, are hereby expressly
provided, but not by way of limitation
or exclusion of any other rights, privileges or obligations of the said party:
1.

Non-operators shall have access
to the lands, suhject to this agreement, at all reasonable times to
inspect and observe operations of
every kind and character upon the
property.

2.

X on-operators shall have access
at all reasonable times to any and
all information pertaining to
wells, drilling, production secured
and oil marketed and to the books,
records and vouchers relating to
the operation of the lands, subject
to this agreement.

3.

Operator shall, upon request, furnish the non-operators with daily
drilling reports, true and complete
copies of well logs, as soon as possible after the preparation thereof, tank tables, daily gauge and
run tickets and reports of stock on .
hand the first of each month; and
shall also, upon request, make
available samples and cuttings
from any and all wells drilled in
which non-operator has an interest on the said lands.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

YIII.

DUTIEH OF OPERATOR
A.

Operator shall, at all times, keep the
joint interests of the parties hereto in
and to the leases and product therefrom and equipment free and clear of
all labor and mechanic's liens and
encumbrances. *.:•***

B.

X on-operators shall have a lien on the
interests of the operators in said leases
and agreen1ents and the oil and gas
produced therefrom, the proceeds
thereof and the material and equipment thereof to secure the payment of
operator's proportionate share of the
costs and expenses of developing and
operating the said lands for the purpose of keeping said property free
and clear of liens and encun1brances
upon the property of non-operators.
Any surns recovered from the disposition of operator's property for the
payment of the obligations of the
operator shall be applied first to costs,
second upon the obligations of the
operator, and any balance remaining
thereafter shall be paid to the operator
or to it~ successors or assigns."

~.

J. Putnatn testified that he was employed by
the Appellant as sales engineer and sales representative
in Utah (R. 103). That in the spring of 1949 he was introduced to a gentleman named Covey in Y ernal ( R. 106)
and that this Mr. Covey said he wa~ interested in strik:\fr.
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ing gas in the Morrison formation, and that he had an
interest in the (Slaugh) well. There was no discussion
of whoHe credit was hack of the well operation (R. 107).
Later, and in about ~~ ay or June, he asked Mr. Baird
who was interested in the well and Mr. Baird named
"The l oveys, Ken Garff, Hafer, and a Doctor or two"
none of whom were familiar to the witness (R. 108-109).
At that time l\lr. Baird advised him that the Coveys were
going into the oil business in San Juan Basin (R. 108,
109).

I

IJL

I

iU]
I

I

;a;

a~I

1

l\lr. Putnam further testified that well-drillers need
mud or che1nicals in a hurry when they need them and
that suppliers must be on a 24-hour a day basis (R. 111).
This is to avoid interrupting drilling operations (R. 113).
Delivery tickets for suppliers were made out "in our
warehouse" at Vernal, Utah, by Mr. Liscombe and
occasionally by Putnam (R. 120).
Mr. Putnam further testified that the material sold
to Baird and Robbins was picked up at the warehouse
usually by J. N. Karren or T. J. Colton and delivery
tickets were made up at the time ( R. 122).
On Cross-examination l\1r. Putnam testified that he
made no credit investigation before commencing sales
to Baird and Robbins (R. 127) and gave his company
no advice as to their credit (R. 129). He made the
arrangements with Mr. Liscombe for warehouse services
and they were to pay him 15 cents per 100 pounds on
everything that went out of the warehouse except· ten
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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13
cents on barite ( R. 131). Liseomlw consulted with him
on the replenishments and they endeavored to keep the
supply up to where it should be (R. 13~). He never
talked to any of the (_ 0Yeys concerning the supplies being
delivered. The corporation operated in the same way
before and after qualification in Utah (R. 143). Most of
the supplies delivered 'vere via certificated carriers or
wild catters, and Baird and Robbins were the only people
who picked up most of their supplies at the warehouse
(R. 1-±5 ). He testified in a number of hearings before
the Public Service Con1mission of Utah in support of
carriers to haul their products from the warehouse to
the wells and understands that these were hearings concerning intrastate conunerce (R. 148, 149).
1

It is the Company's practice to sell to anyone drilling

an oil well and normally he is able to pay ( R. 153). He
and
the

~I r.

Liscmnhe both had keys to the premises where

compan~''s

products were stored (R. 154).

Richard D. Ruckenbrod testified that he is an attorney and prepared Articles of Incorporation for the
Baird and Robbins Drilling Company, Inc. and that
upon the incorporation, partnership activities ceased

(R. 193, 194 & 198).
The corporation 1nade

::-~ocial

security and unemploy-

ment payments of its employees for the drilling of the
Slaugh well (R. 209). The corporation also made withholding tax payments (R. :210).
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POINTH RELIED ON
{{p:-;pondents take issue with Appellant on the two
({llP~tion:-; ~tatPd hy the Appellant as follows:

I

tlif

Point One
Sales of goods in interstate commerce are exempt from
the provisions of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3 U. C. A. 1953.
Point Two
All of the sales concerned in this action are sales in
interstate commerce under the original package doctrine.

On their cross appeal Respondents also urge points
of error which result in a finding that Respondents and
Baird and Robbins were engaged in a mining partnership
in the drilling of this well as follows :
Point Three
No evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of
Fact No. 7, that the drilling corporation was a fraud and a
fiction and a disregard of the corporate entity is not available to Appellant.
Point Four
No mining partnership existed.

ARGUMENT
Point One
Sales of goods in interstate commerce are exempt from
the provisions of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3 U. C. A. 1953.
Respondents do not quarrel partcularly with this
statement of the law; but including the statement in this
case suggests an application beyond the mere statement.
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\Yhere a corporation is engaged only in intt>rstate cmnmerce in a given state and has no other activities therein,
the state1nent is proper. This is all that is involved in
the cases cited by Appellant under this point.
But the Court here found that the Appellant was
doing business in the ~tate of Utah. The cases do not
go so far as to hold that actions arising out of interstate
eonunerce can be 1naintained in a state where the corporation is doing intrastate business without complying
with the laws of that state. But this question is largely
academic here because if the Appellant corporation was
doing business in Ptah it was doing business because of
the nature of the sales it was making. The characteristics
of those sales constituted both a ter1nination of the
interstate move1nent and the doing of business in Utah.
These activities in nmking sales require compliance with
the Statute. Point No. :2 is therefore controlling on
Appellant's case.
Point Two
All of the sales concerned in this action are sales in
interstate commerce under the original package doctrine.

Here again, there is no great divergence of view
between the Appellant and the Respondents. The review
of the original package doctrine is factual and is important in dealing with cases where the original packages
are or could be broken prior to the 1naking of a sale
which could be either interstate or local. l t is a convenient
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line of demarcation. ln Dahnke-Walker Mining Company
I'S. C. 1'. llmulnrant, ~-l-7 U.S. 282, 66 L. ed. 239, 42 S. Ct.
lOfi, <·ited at page Hi of Appellant's brief the treatment of
original pa<~kages wa~ all dictum. But the limitations of
t IH• do<· trine are indicated in Appellant's own cases.
U·/clwllenberger us. l)ennsylvania, Austin vs. Tennessee
aud Cook vs. illarshall Crmnty discussed at pages 33 to
;);~ of Appellant's brief.)
r:rhe question in this case ~~ whether anything is
accomplished hy examining into whether the packages
of a product have been changed or broken when the
original packing case is of such size and construction
as to be useable for shipping as well as for final use by
the consumer. \Vhere there is no breaking of bulk and
taking packages from a container or shipping case has
the manufacturer been able to extend the concept of
interstate commerce purely because the package was not
changed from the tin1e it left the hands of the manufacturer until it was ultimately consumed~ Such a suggestion ignores the position of the original package
doctrine as a convenient rule of thumb and makes it a
dogma of the law without reason.
The question the court should be interested in is
whether Appellant was engaged in business inUtah. If
it was then the Court below correctly held that no action
can be maintained on any sales made prior to qualification.
The cases hold generally that where interstate goods
have come to rest, are displayed for sale, with orders
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taken and sales initiated and completed after the goods
have con1e to rest, it is an interstate business and the
conunerce clause will not affect powers of the states to
require qualification.
In Aduan{'t>-Rwmley Thresher Company vs. Stohl, 75
Utah 1:2-J., :2S3 Pac. 781 and Kansas City Wholesale vs.
Weber Packing Corporation, 93 Utah -!14, 73 Pac. 2d
1272, the entire business in Utah was involved in the
isolated transactions brought before the court and there
was no regular course of business within the State of
rtah. The Court held that the sales were interstate, that
the company was not doing business in Utah, and that
the suits could be maintained.
In 1.llarchant vs. National Reserve Compawy of
America, 103 rtah 530 at 546, 137 Pac. 2d 331 at 337
and 338 the court held that to constitute doing business
in the State there must be a continuing course of business
with some permanence about it. ':l_1hat is the significance
of the evidence here that :Mud Control Laboratories did
business in Utah in its usual way (R. 142) and did business with a large number of customers in a very substantial volu1ne (Exhibit 3, Answer 12). Keeping an
employee who was an engineer, establishing a laboratory,
an office, a warehouse from which sales could be made
(R. 241, :242) show that this was a regular part of the
Appellant's business, and that it had both substance and
permanence.
The permanence was, of course, indicated when the
corporation qualified in July, 1949, and has since that
date continued to do business in the State of Ftah.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
rl1 he Appellant must succeed, if at all, on the isolated
principle of the original package doctrine. The reference
to the original package doctrine in Dahnke-Walker Mini ll.fl ( 'o111 pauy 1;s. C. T. Bondurant, 257 U. f.;. 282, 66, L.
3d. ~:m, 4:2 S. Ct. 106 at page 17 of Appellant's brief is
dictmn as the case involved the purchase of wheat in
hulk. rrhe same i~ true of Wallace vs. Currin, 95 Fed.
~d 856 cited at page 19 of the brief. This case involves
grading of tobacco in bunches in warehouses and was
held to be related to interstate commerce within the
Federal Grading and Inspection Act and could have had
no relationship to the original package doctrine.

Talbot vs. Smith, 277 S. \V. :257 is an original package
case and goes a long way in holding that the transaction
in that case did not involve doing business in the State
of Kentucky. The case holds that where a North Carolina concern sent 50 sets of aluminum ware to Kentucky
and a crew of salesmen to take orders for the ware which
orders were submitted to a Kentucky merchant for credit
ok that the company was not doing business in the state.
The distinguishing factors are obvious; in Talbot vs.
Smith, the concern had no office, no regular stock of
goods available for purchase by an agent or employee in
Kentucky, had no employees and no regular course of
doing business.
Pace Manufacturing Company vs. Milliken, 70 Fed.
Supp. 740 cited at page 20 of the brief contains no description of the packages and is based upon the doctrine
that delivery is not complete while the goods are in
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po~~e~sion

of a carrier whieh ha~ moved the goods in an
interstate shipn1ent, and that they, therefore, are not
subject to the police power of the ~tate. The goods in
that case were taken from the possession of the railway
expre~~ agency following an interstate movement. 'J1he
facts are so different a~ to make the (·a~p of no value.
~\t

r.

page ~0, ~\ppellant eites the case of Department
of Public Ctilities rs. Arkan~as-Lou.isiana Gas Company,
108 S. \Y. :2d 586, 194 Ark. 354, aff. 58 S. Ct. 770, 304
F. ~. 61, 82 L. 3d. 11-19, and a passage which is again
dichun. This case involved sale of natural gas moving
in an interstate pipe line and drawn from the pipe line
for sale to customers in Arkansas. Despite the dictu1n
the court held that the corporation was not sufficiently
present in Arkansas as to be subject to the Arkansas
Laws requiring the filing of comprehensive reports
covering its business.
It is plain from the cases of Schollenberger v.
Pennsylvania, 171 r. S. 1, Austin rs. Tennessee, 179 U. S.
343, Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261, and Kirmeyer L Kansas, 236 F. S. 568, discussed in Appellant's
brief at pages 22-34, that the original package doctrine
is useful in marking the point at which interstate shipment ends and intrastate movement begins, but that the
doctrine is only of evidentiary value and not an absolute
rule. Where a large shipping box contains smaller boxes
it is apparent that receipt of the large box, breaking its
bulk and apportioning the s1naller boxes for local use is
a convenient line of demarcation. For cigarettes in small
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hoxPs it is insufficient to extend interstate commerce
(Austin vs. Tewnessee, ~mpra, Cook vs. Marshall Co111nty,
supra.) As applied to lumber, bulk grain, milk or gasoline in tanks the doctrine has little value. F'or instance
in llaldwin vs. Sl~elig, 294 lT. f.;, 511 L. Ed. 1032,55 S. Ct.
-l!)7, a New York regulation of milk designed to make the
price of outside milk competitive with local milk was
held invalid as a burden and restriction on interstate
commerce and in holding that the form of the package
was immaterial the Supreme Court said:

"There are purposes for which merchandise,
transported fr01n another state, will be treated as
a part of the general 1nass of property at the
state of destination though still in the original
containers. * * * In brief, the test of the original
package is not an ultimate principle. It is an
illustration of a principle. * * * It marks a convenient boundary and one sufficiently precise
save in exceptional conditions."
and in Stanton and Sons vs. Los Angeles County, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 181, 177 Pac. 2d 804, the court refused the original package doctrine as related to shipments of lumber
and referred to it in this manner:
"The gossamer of law is the wrapping which
makes a load of lumber the original package and
when sorted and stacked with other loads for
facility in selling the original package is broken."
The Court cited F. May & Company vs. New Orleans, 178
U. S. 496, 20 S. Ct. 977, 44 L. ed. 1165.
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H'alling rs. Jacksonrillr Paper Company, 317 U. S.
56-l:, S7 L. ed. -HiO, repre~ent~ a realistic approach to the
problen1. rrhat ease involved the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Aet which adrnittedly goe~ to the extreme of
the power of l 'ongre~s over interstate commerce in regulating working eonditions, hours, and pay of persons
whose \Vork is connected with interstate commerce. In
that ease a manufacturer out of the state shipped rnerchandise into Florida for handling in thre~ different ways:
some shipments went direct from the rnill to customers
in Florida: sonre shiprnents were made on special order
and consigned to a branch office designated for delivery
to a specific customer: and the balance, which was most
of the business, .was shipped to a branch warehouse
without order and held subject to the taking o( orders
frorn a fairly stahle group of customers as to kind and
amount of merchandise so that their needs could be
estimated with a fair degree of accuracy. rrhe Supreme
Court held that the third category involved intrastate
commerce and that the work of employees was beyond
the Federal Fair Standards Act. At page 466 the
Supreme Court said:
"'l,he entry of the goods into the warehouse
interrupts but does not necessarily terminate their
interstate journey. A temporary pause in their
transit does not mean that they are no longer 'in
commerce' within the meaning of the act."
This was true as to all of the goods but as to the third
category the interruption was held to terminate the comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
merce. The third category was like the goods of Mud
Control Laboratories in this case which came to rest in
\T ernal, were held for sale to any one of a number
of customers representing a fairly stable group whose
needs could be predicted with reasonable accuracy.
The movement from the Vernal warehouse to the
Baird and Robbins well site was intrastate commerce for
rate purposes even though the movement was in the
original packages. See Oregon Railroad amd Navigation
Company vs. Campbell, 180 Fed. 253, 60 A. L. R. 1484.
The fact that Mr. Putnam testified before the Public
Service Commission of Utah in behalf of intrastate
carriers is further evidence of the nature of the shipment.
We see no essential difference between the Vernal
warehouse and a store which sells cement, sugar, or
drilling supplies which come into the state in bags of
a convenient size for ultin1ate sale and use. :M:r. l{arren
drove to Vernal in a Baird and Robbins truck, selected
the merchandise he wanted, signed a delivery ticket for
the merchandise, took it to the well site, and proceeded
to use it. In the same manner would he go to a grocery
store for a bag of sugar or salt needed by the drilling
company and purchase it on credit.
In Midlamd Lilnseed Products Company vs. Warren
Brothers Co. (C.C.A. 6) 46 Fed. 2d 870, capacity to maintain an action was challenged and the court held that
where barrels of linseed oil were shipped in carloads
from out of the state and sold from a warehouse in the
originai barrels that the corporation had to qualify as
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doing business within the state, with no rnention of tlw
original package doctrine. Senaca Textile Corp,ora,tion
vs. Jlissuuri Flo·zcer & Feather Co. (Mo. app.) 119 S.W. 2d
991 held that a corporation nmst qualify to bring suit
on fact~ 8imilar to the operation in the principal case,
there being no disclosure in the opinion of the type of
merchandise involved or the type of package and no
rnention of the original package doctrine. Dalton A.ddilng
Jlachine Sales Company vs. Lindquist, 137 vVash. 375
2-t.~ Pac. 643, 646, 647, involved facts very close to those
in our case except that the product involved was adding
machines and without discussing the original packages
or the doctrine the court held that the corporation must
qualify to maintain the action. In Star Square AutoSupply Compawy ~s. Gerk, 325 Mo. 968, 30 S. W. 2d
447 at 460 after discussing a case which referred to the
original package doctrine the court held that where
auton1obile tires are received in interstate commerce,
conuuingled with other tires and held for sale, the interstate commerce has ended, this being a police power case.
Reliance Fertilizer Company vs. Davis, 124 Fla. 859, 169
S. 579, involved capacity to sue and again without disclosing the forrn of packaging or discussing the original
package doctrine the court held that shipment of fertilizer into a state subject to taking orders and making·
delivery involved doing business in the state and required
qualification. The same holding was made where the
erection of advertising signs was the doing business as
found in National Sign Corporation vs. Moccar Cleveland Sales Corporation, 33 Ohio App. 89, 168 N. E. 758.
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Dealing in barrels and kegs which were never opened
hut which wPn• received in interstate commerce and sold
t'rotu a war<>lwu~e wa~ involved in Hollingshead Corn~
J)(lll.'f rs. Uoker ( 1~J~G) -t rrenn. App. 362. There the
Corporatiou wa~ doing intrastate business and could not
maintain the ~uit although the original package doctrine
wa~ not dise11~sed. Shipw<'nt of good:-_; to an agent who
thereafter took orders and delivered the goods was held
to be intrastate commerce in J ewe! Tea Company vs.
Patillo, 50 Ga. App. 6:W, 178 S. E. 926, and Jewel Tea
Company ~·s. Williams (C. C. A. 10) 118 Fed. 2d 202.
It was held the corporation could not maintain the action
because it was doing local business in Seidenback vs. A.
E. Little Company, 146 Okla. 274, 294 Pac. 126, where.
shoes were shipped into Oklahoma in interstate commerce and sold through a department store on a commission basis, title remaining in the out of state manufacturer until sold.
It seems that the significant fact in these cases is
the unimportance of the original package doctrine since
it would n1ake such an easy point of decision for the
courts to rely on if the doctrine had substantial significance.
If original packages served a purpose as shipping
containers and if the point at which interstate commerce
ended and intrastate commerce began were a difficult
one, the original package doctrine would still have
validity. But the courts have refused to be bound by
this rule where the r·eason for the rule did not exist.
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Here the court found the ..\ ppellant wa~ doing business
in Utah. Thi~ finding was possible only because interstate ship1uent had ended, the goods werp held in Utah
awaiting custmner~, and the nwve1nent out of the warehouse was an entirely separate, intrastate 1novement.
Point Three
No evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of
Fact No. 7, that the drilling corporation was a fraud and a
fiction and a disregard of the corporate entity is not available to Appellant.

_.

This is of great ilnportance because the corporation
had no interest in the lease. It is a prerequisite to a
mining partnership that there be a joint ownership in
the lease or the land. Bentley vs. Brossard, 33 Utah 396,
94 Pac. 736; 1lf eister vs. Farrow, 190 Mont. 1, 93 P. 2d
753; U. 8. rs. Wholesale Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10) 154 P. 2d
7-!5.
If the corporation did the drilling and purchased
supplies from Appellant there was no partnership with
cross-appellants and no n1ining partnership. The Court
avoided this question by finding the corporation to he
a fraud and a fiction (Finding 7, R. 240). The court
also found (Finding 5, R. 239) that the well was drilled
by 1\L E. Baird and H. L. Robbins doing business as
Baird and Robbins Drilling Company. This Finding
might appear to follow necessarily from Finding No. 7,
disregarding the corporate entity. If F'inding No. 7 was
beyond the issues available to the Appellant, then the
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new trial should have been granted to detennine who
actually did the drilling-the corporation or the partner~hip-without any impelled conclusion because the
corporation was a fiction.
'rher<> i~ much evidence that the corporation drilled
the well. 1'he Joint Operating Agreement (Exhibit C)
authorized Baird and Hobbins to drill the well through
a closed corporation. rrhe Corporation had just been
formed on December 31, 1948, when the Agreement was
finally signed on January G, 1949 (R. 194, 197, 198, 199).
And 1\lr. Ruckenbrod testified that upon formation of
the corporation the partnership didn't function any more
(R. 197). Appellant made no determination of whom or
what Baird and Robbins were, but sent invoices to
•· Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." and four to "Baird and
Robbins" (Exhibit B). All delivery tickets likewise were
in the name of "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." except
one to "Baird and Robbins" (Exhibit A).
Appellant filed an action in the Fourth District
Court against ''Baird and Robbins Drilling Company,
a corporation" on or a·bout September 23, 1949, for this
same cause of action, and obtained a judgment by default
on December 9, 1949 after presentation of evidence
(Exhibits 1 and 2). Exhibits 4 and 5 are checkbooks of
the corporation showing that drilling expenses were paid
with corporation checks. The corporation paid income
withholding, soc'ial security and unemployment taxes on
the drilling operations (R. 209-210). The bank account
at Vernal was in the name of "Baird and Robbins Drill-
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ing· l'o., Inc." (Exhibit ~ and J~xhibits marked "Bank of
Yernal" including eheeks and staten1ents). The Continental Bank and rrru~t Cmnpany account was in the name
of "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." (Exhibits F, G, and
envelope ruarked July, 19-!~) but the checks used in that
account were plainly marked "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co., Inc." (Exhibib 6, 7, 5 and envelope marked
July, 194~l).
There is no evidence that Appellant made any
inquiries about who was drilling the well and who would
pay for it. Appellant simply sold mud and assumed
that whoever was drilling the well would pay for it (R.
153). ~ehere was no fraud, rnisleading, misrepresen tations, reliance or change of position. Appellant believed
it was selling to a corporation, brought suit and took a
judgment against the corporation. Now it seeks to
create a windfall for itself by proving a partnership it
never relied on in extending credit.
Filing suit and obtaining judgment should estop the
Appellant from changing its mind ( 13 Am. J ur. Corporations, sections 63 and 69), and is alrnost conclusive
evidence of the party it believed it dealt with (See
Exhibit 1).
In order to clairn that the corporation was a fiction
the person rnaking the clairn n1ust have been m'isled or
must have relied to his prejudice on representations.
The law as to disregarding the corporate entity is
discussed in Sections 7 and 8 of 13 Am. J ur. on Corporations as follows:
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"'rhe doctrine that a corporation is a legal
en ~ity existing separate and apart from the persons composing it is a legal theory introduced for
purpoHes of convenience and to subserve the ends
of justice. The eoncept cannot, therefore, be
extended to a point beyond its reason and policy,
and when invoked in support of an end subversive
of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts.
Thus, in an appropriate case and in furtherance
of the ends of justice, a corporation and the
individual or individuals owning all its stock and
assets will be treated as identical, the corporate
entity being disregarded where used as a cloak
or cover for fraud or !illegality."
Annotations on the question are at 1 A. L. R. 610 and
34 A. L. R. 597. The general rule is that the corporate
entity will not be disregarded with exceptions to this
rule where creditors would be defrauded, where corporations are formed to avoid liability under contracts, or
where individuals have attempted to shield themselves
through a corporation. The later annotation at page
602 quotes a rule for relief from Minifie vs. Rowley,
187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 :
"Before the acts and obligations of a corporation can be legally recognized as those of a particular person, and vice versa, the following combination of dircumstances must be made to appear:
First, that the corporation is not only influenced
and governed by that person, but that there is
such a unity of interest and ownership that the
individuality, or separateness, of the sa'id person
and corporation has ceased; second, that the
facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of
the separate existence of the corporation would,
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under the particular eircmn~tant·e~, sanction a
fraud or pron1ote injustiee."
In Surgical Supply Center rs. lnd'llstrial Commission (Utah 1950) ~:23 Pac. 2nd 593 at page 596, the Court
discU:3:3ed the rules as to disregarding a corporate entity
in a ca:3e entirely different on its facts and observed:
·•\Ye recognize that the courts have often
looked through the veil of corporate structure in
order to prevent fraud or injustice. Old Ben Coal
Co. v. Universal Coal Co., 248 Mich. 486, 227
X. \Y. 794; People ex rel. Attorney General vs.
~Iichigan Bell Telephone Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224
X. \Y. 438. However, no question of fraud is
involved in the present case, and we find no occassion to disregard the corporate entities of the two
plaintiffs.''

~·

Also in Geary vs. Cain, 79 rtah 268, 9 Pac. 2nd 396,
the Court was dealing with fraudulent conveyances to a
corporation and the possibility of ignoring the legal
fiction in order to prevent fraud, holding, however, that
because the stockholders were not the persons accused
of comrnitting fraud, and that they did not hold the
stock of the corporation in trust for the fraudulent person the corporate fiction could not he disregarded but
did say:
··Courts of equity and courts of law as well,
and courts which administer both law and equity
in the same action, as do the courts of this state,
will, to prevent fraud and accornplish justice, in
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proper cases ignore the legal fiction that a corporation is a person separate and distinct from the
person or group of persons who own its stock.
Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah, 623,
:2:21 P. H56; D. l. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assurance (;o., 2g4 Ill. 343, 120 N. E. 268, 1 A. L. R.
60:2, and annotation on page 610. *** The doctrine
simply means that the courts, ignoring forms and
looking to the substance of things, will regard
the stockholders of a corporation as the owners of
its property, or as the real parties in interest,
whenever it is necessary to do so to prevent a
fraud which might otherwise be perpetrated, to
redress a wrong which might otherwise go without redress, or to do justice which might otherwise fail. It cannot be applied in this case, which
is an action against the corporation and a person
who holds but one share of its stock, so long as it
appears that there are other stockholders, who
are not parties to the action, owning all but one
of the outstanding shares and it is not made to
appear that they hold the same in trust for Addison Cain."
There is no evidence that after March 7, 1949, the
date of the first sale by Appellant, there was any act
connected with drilling except by and in behalf of the
corporation. There is no evidence to support Finding
No. 5 and it must be assumed that it followed, in the
Court's reasoning, from Finding No. 7. This is a fallacy,
because even if the corporate entity is to be disregarded
the result would be to treat the stockholders as the
responsible parties individually. Assume a joint venSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\['

r:

!

ill

31
ture between the corporation and cross-appellants and
then sueh faets as require the corporate entity to be disregarded. \Y ould not the result be to place the corporate
obligation on the stoekholders, without any expansion of
the obligations of the Respondents? The case of Geary
L Cain (supra) seems apt. If there is fraud or other
equitable basis for disregarding the corporate entity the
stockholders will be held accountable but the rule will
not apply where the stockholders are strangers to the
fraud. ~o here, if the corporate entity is disregarded
the brunt of the burden would fall, not on the stockholders of the corporation or on the persons responsible
for creation of the corporation but on crss-appellants
whose only offense was to deal with the corporation.
The judgment of the Court allowing recovery against
cross-appellants was based in part upon the finding that
the corporation was a fraud and a fiction, which is wholly
unsupported in the evidence and which is a position not
available to Appellants against these Cross-Appellants.
:Burthennore, there is no evidence to support the finding
that the well was drilled by the partnership, and even
if there were that evidence is so weak as to indicate that
the court's finding was largely based upon its view that
the corporate entity could be disregarded. A new trial
should have been granted to determine, entirely apart
from any tendency to disregard the corporate entity,
whether the well was actually drilled by the corporation
or the partnership. The burden of proof as to this was
on Appellant.
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Point Four
No mining partnership existed.

For two reasons there was no mining partnership,
a part from the questions raised under Point Three:
I~,i rst,

I

•;.

I,
~~

there was no sharing of losses;

Second, there was no joint control or operation.

First, there was no sharing of losses.
Had there been no mention of losses the law might
imply a sharing of losses from a general operation together and from the sharing of profits. Cross-Appellants
admit that the joint operating agreement provided for
division of profits, 12% to cross-Appellants and 88% to
Baird and Robbins. But this agreement was drawn to
negative a sharing of losses and specifically accomplishes
that. "The Coveys were willing to purchase interests
only on certain conditions" (R. 199) and the joint operating agreement contains those provisions, as above
quoted at pages 3 to 11.
Paragraph I A of the Joint Operating Agreement
limits the investment to $16,000 plus the purchase of pipe
( Par. ID) the $16,000 to be used for "Development of
Well One" (Par. IV) "and no part of any costs or
expenses for the drilling of said well ... shall be charged
or be a claim upon the second parties." A corporation
owned by Baird and Robbins could drill the well "in
which even it is understood said corporation shall have
no claim against the second parties, nor any lien against
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said leasehold ... " (Par. I Y B). .-\nd further: "Operator shall, at all tinH:'s, keep the joint interests of the
parties hereto in and to the leases and product therefrom
and equipn1ent free and clear of all labor and mechanic's
liens and eneumbrances. '' (Par. VIII A).
The ea~es have not, and thi~ Court surely will not,
impose a liability for losses on parties who have specifieally contracted that the losses shall be borne by Baird
and Robbins. X o policy of the law suggests this and
no conduct of cross-appellant·s or act of reliance by
Appellant suggests any equity in such a position.
~lining

partnerships are governed generally by
partnership law with three essential differences: the
interests are assignable, death of a partner does not cause
dissolution, and authority of a partner to bind the partnership is limited to usual mining expense. Bentley v.
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 Pac. 736, 743. Therefore as to
any question involved in this case, the law is the same.

It is a requirement of both a general Inerchantice
partnership and a mining partnership that there be a
·sharing of losses. Or. stated conversely, where the agreement precludes a sharing of losses no partnership arises.
Of course, the parties could form a partnership as to
third parties and limit losses as between themselves, but
here there is no such intent and the only question is
whether the agremnent established a partnership by
implication of law and contrary to the intentions of the
parties.
The agreement that no losses should be bourne by
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prevented the implication of a partner:-;hip. Fanners' and Merchants' National Bank v. Anderson, :2:)0 N. W. 214, 216 Iowa 988; Farmers' Coop v.
Furnll'rs' Union, 260 Pac. 7'55, 127 Okl. 27·5; McAnally
r. Cochran, 170 Okl. 368, .f() Pac 2d 955;Ash et al vs.
11! ickdson, 118 Old. 1fi3, 2-t 7 Pac. 680; 68 C. J. f-.;. 429-430;
;)s C. J. S. m~H, f>91; 40 Am. Jur. 153; 131 A. L. R. 508,
;);~~); ~Vhit(~ 1:. Houston l.~nmher Co., 179 Okl. 89, 64 Pac.
2J 908.
Fanners' and Merchants' NatiotUJl Bank v. Anderson
(supra) was an action to enforce liability for debts of an
oil deYelopment venture on the theory of partnership.
At pages :n 7-218 of ~50 X. \\~. the court held :
('J'OHH-appt>llantH

"*** that, while it is not necessary that such agreement should be express as to all its terms, it is
necessary that it be shown that it was the understanding and intention of the parties that there
be a community of interest in capital, a sharing
of the profits, and a mutual liability for the losses;
and that, in the absence of any one of these elements, there can be no real partnership. ***
"It is quite true that this court has repeatedly
stated that it is not necessary that there be an
express agreement establishing mutual liability
for losses, and that, where the community of
interest in capital and division of profits is clearly
shown, the mutual liability for losses will be
implied unless shown to be inconsistent with the
intention of the parties. It is equally clear that
under our decisions an express agreement on the
subject of losses will control, and that if such
agreement provide for nonliability for lo~ses, this
fact alone will negative the existence of a partnerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~hip.

A~ said in \·eenstra Y. ~lathe\\'8, 194 Iowa
190 X. \Y. 3~~. ~)S3: "It is strenuously argued
by the defendant that tlwre wa8 no partnership
because there wa8 no agreement for a division of
lo~~e~. It i~ true that there was no express agreeInent for such division. It is not essential that
there ~hould he, though it is essential to the
exi8tenee of a partnership that there be a mutual
liability for losses. In the absence of express
agreement on the subject of losses, the mutual
liability for losses will be i1nplied where the fact
of partnership is established by other evidence.
Of course, if there be an express agreement on the
subject of losses, such agreement will control. If
:-::uch express agree1nent negative the sharing of
losses, it negatives the partnerhip." ***

7~):~.

"\Yhere a man has contributed his money to
and taken the risk of losing it in an enterprise,
with the distinct understanding and agreement
that he shall not be liable for any greater amount
than the money thus contributed, we are unable
to see the justice or reasonableness of a doctrine
which says that he must nevertheless be held liable
to one who has dealt with such enterprise, with
full knowledge of the terms of the agreen1ent that
the man who contributed his money to such enterprise shall not be liable for any of the debts
thereof."
And in our case, where there was no knowledge in Appellant about a possible partnership, Appellant is in better
position than if it had known all about the agreement.
68 C. J. ~. Partnerships, pp. 429-430 thus states the rule:
"Accordingly, as a general rule, the absence
of a liability to bear the losses or expenses of a
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husiness ordinarily indicates that no partnership
was intended or exists, and it has been held that,
where the effed of an agreement between two or
more persons in relation to the prosecution of an
entPrprise provides that, although all are to share
in the profits one of their number shall incur no
risk and be chargeable with no loss, the agreement
is not one of partnership."

Second, there was no joint control or operation.
"rhe Joint Operating Agreement (Exhibit C) provided that "Operator" (Baird and Robbins or their
corporation) should carry on the drilling operation. This
Agreement gave "Operator" the "sole right of prospecting and exploring the lands" subject to the agreement
(Par. III A); gave "Operator" the sole right and discretion to hire and control employees "and such employees
shall be the employees of the operator and under its sole
direction and orders" (Par. III B) ; and all CrossAppellants had were the rights of inspection and information (Par. VII B). This lack of joint operation prevented implication of a partnership or the arising of a
partnership including Cross-Appellants as members.

McAnally v.s. Cochran (supra);
U.S. vs. Wholesale Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10), 154 Fed.
2d 745;
Johanson Brothers Builders vs. Board of Review,
Industrial Commission (Utah 19·50) 22'2 Pac.
563, 567;
Bentley vs. Brossard (supra);
131 A. L. R. 508, 540, 541 ;
68 C.J.S., 42·5-426; 58 C.J.S. 688;
4 Summers Oil and Gas. S ecs. 723, 724.
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The requisites of a 1uining partnership are thus
~tated

in 58 C. J.

~.

688:

"\Yith respect to the ele1nents of the relation
of a n1ining partnership each case must necessarily be determined by its own facts. However,
there are three basic requiren1ents which must
always be pre~ent for the creation and existence
of the relationship, and they are co-ownership,
joint operation, and an agreement to share in
profits and losses. It has been also held that, in
addition to the above, community of interest and
mutual agency are also necessary. ***"
This treatise goes on to consider these three elements in greater detail, stating that joint ownership is
not sufficient to make a mining partnership, nor is
mutual agency, and as to the requisite of joint operation,
makes this statement at page 690:
"Joint operation. An agreement for cooperation and the joint working of a mine is essential to
the creation of a mining partnership; and in some
jurisdictions an actual joint operation or developInent is essential. As a general rule a mining
partnership arises when two or more co-owners
or lessees of a mining claim actually engage in
working it and share according to the interest of
each, although there is no express agreement
between them to become partners; but mere joint
operation of a mine or well will not necessarily
create a partnership."
The same question was discussed 1n McAnally vs.
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('u('hran (Hupra) where an agreement was rnade to use

well-drilling tools and in consideration thereof to assign
an interPHt in the lease, the borrower of the tools undertaking the actual drilling and doing the hiring and paying of employPPH. The court held that operation of a
mining leaHe IJy <'o-tenants did not establish a mining
partnership and quoted the following language from
Gillespie rs. Shufflin, 91 Okl. 72, 216 Pac. 132 at page
956 of 46 Pae. ~d :
"In order to constitute a mining partnership,
the parties must cooperate in developing a lease
for oil and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of
the expenses and to share in the profits or
losses. •••
"Inter sese, there must be an intention of the
partners to do so, in order to create a partnership
and such intention cannot be inferred, alone, from
a joint venture in drilling a well."
The Court then quoted fron1 the earlier case of Ash et al
vs. Mickelson, 118 Okla. 163, 247 Pac. 680:
"A mining partnership or joint adventure
cannot exist, unless there is a cooperation among
the parties in the development of a lease for oil
and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of the
expenses and to share in the profits and losses.***
"The mere holding of an interest in an oil
and gas lease and leasehold estate with other
co-tenants and having knowledge that a well was
being drilled thereon by one or more of the cotenants does not constitute "cooperation" as contemplated by the authorities herein cited." ***
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"There i~ no evidence in the record that showl:;
or tends to show that the owners of the leasehold
estate eYer eonten1plated a partnership among
the Yarious 0\nwrs of the lease at the tirne they
purchased an interest in same, sonte of which
were before the well was ever begun. Neither does
the evidence show or tend to show that there was
any such agreernent between the parties during
the progress of the drilling of the well, nor as to
the operation and 1nanage1nent of the well after
production was found. The parties never came
together for the purpose of perfecting such an
arrangement. J. F. Root and F. S. Hoxie had
exclusive control during the drilling of the well
and with no authority to act for any other cotenant, and the same is true after they had reached
the Skinner sand and had decided to make a well
therein. It is not shown that any of the other
parties of interest was ever consulted about
ernploying labor for cleaning the well or doing
any of the other many things necessary to be done
at a new well, or in purchasing tankage or other
equipment necessary therefor. Neither does the
testiinony show that the parties in rharge had any
authority to act for others."
In United States vs. Wholesale Oil ComzJany (supra)
the question was to detennine whether a partnership
existed in the operation of retail gasoline filing stations
or whether the relation was that of employer and
employee. The station rnanagers had a nwnthly drawing
I;

account which was charged against one half of the profits,
the business could not be sold without thP. approval of
tlw

eornpan~T

and when an operator quit the business
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there was an accounting of profits between them and no
distribution of assets. In holding that there was no
partnership the Court stated at page 748:
"Neither did the operator have the right to
exercise his independent judgment in the management and operation of his business. *** The
busine~s was conducted in the name of the company: the bank account was kept in the name of
the company in a hank designated by it; the
checks were written against the account only by
the company and none were written against this
account by the operator save that in an emergency he might draw a check against the account.
••• Neither did he assume any liability for the
debts of the so-called partnership or joint adventure. He did not become liable for merchandise
accounts or for other obligations incurred by the
company."
As a test of joint operations this language is close.
to the activities of the parties here. The Baird and Robbins Company made all decisions concerning the drilling
of the well, controlled all of the funds in bank accounts
to which Cross-Appellants were strangers, purchased
all supplies, employed all laborers and supervisory
employees, and never at any time consulted with CrossAppellants or anyone else concerning decisions to be
made in the drilling of the well. It seems obvious that if
Cross-Appellants had attempted to interfere in any way
with drilling of this well as a partner would have a right
to do, Baird and Robbins would have pointed to the joint
operating agreement and advised Cross-Appellants to
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~tay

out of the drilling- operation. rro suppose that CrossAppellant~ could have 1nade purcha:-;e::-; for the drillingof this well and bound Baird and Robbins thereby would
be to ~treteh thi~ operating- ag-reen1ent beyond any reasonable interpretation-and yet, if a mining- partnership
were intended between parties ~uch aetivities would
have been reasonable. The intention of the parties as
expressed in the operating- ag-ree1nent neg-atives any pos~ihle intended joint operation.
lnJohanson Brothers Builders l's. Board of Review
(supra) the Industrial Connnission determined that no
partnership existed under a plan whereby a brick mason
ag-reed with other brick masons that they would work
together on various jobs all of which would be obtained
by Carl Johanson each of them to share in the profits
according- to a formula. This Court pointed out that
under the rtah Statute a partnership is "an association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-partners of a
business for profit" and also that "all partners have
equal rig-hts in the Inanag-ement and conduct of the partnership business." The Court held that no partnership
was established because, as further pointed out at page
567, the bank account was carried in the nmne of Carl
F. Johanson and wife and no one else had a right to
draw on it; Johanson mingled contracting business funds
with other income; all the equipment belonged to J ohanson and there was no acquisition of an interest in such
assets by the other interested parties ; and only Carl
.Johanson could have contracted for any job. The practical tests applied to that case could he equally applied to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42
thiH case.

Baird and Robbins owned trucks, and preother equipment (see Exhibit C, Par.
IV B), leased equipment, made all decisions concerning
operations, banked the money in their account mingling
it with other funds in hoth the Continental and Bank of
\'t>rnal accounts and consulted with Cross-Appellants in
no particular.
~umahly

~orne

question of llllDIDg partnership WaS Carefully
considered by this court in Bentley vs. Brossard (supra)
in 1908. In that case one Fannof owned a mine and
entered into a lease with one Brossard for development
of the mine in equal interests, with the proviso that
Fannof should not be held for any of the expenses or
losses. The lease required Brossard to work and develop
the claims in a proper manner, to employ a specified
number of men, to sell the ore and divide the proceeds in
an agreed manner. Fannof could be employed if the.
operation was with steam. Brossard also had the right
to purchase an interest in the property at a given price.
Brossard then entered into agreement with other people
who were made defendants with him in the case, these
people agreeing to advance certain sums of money "for
development of said mining claims and the carrying
out of" the Fannof contract. Proceeds accruing- to Bros._..
sard were to be shared with the people he interested.
Brossard had charge <lf the work and supervised it

I.,.•
I

I-.

rnlP

although there was evidence that the other contributors
joined in the operation and participated in the decisions.
Action was brought by a laborer against Brossard and
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tho~e intere~ted with hin1, and although Fannof te~t ified
at the trial he was not rnade a party defendant.
The trial court subrnitted the (•asP to the jury on
the question of the rnining partnership and the Suprerne
Court held that the contracts and the evidence constituted a mining partnership as a matter of law .
.:\lthough Fannof appears to be in the position that the
Cros~-)qJpellants are in here, he was not nrade a party
in that action. The Court held that the contract itself
created the relationship of partnership quoting a decision
that the requisites of joining together for the common
benefit, each contributing property or services, and having a connnunity of interests in the profits was sufficient (page 407 of 33 Utah). The court discussed the
requirement of sharing losses and further that the agreement to share profits with nothing said about losses was
prima facie an agreen1ent to share losses which is also
necessary to a partnership (page -!08). At the bottorn
of the same page the court relies heavily upon the contract between Brossard and Fannof which was the
inducement of the subleases, and it was this contract
which cornmitted the sublessees to the program of working and developing the mines in accordance with the

lease. It was irnpossihle for them to undertake to perform the Fannof contract without associating thernselves
together within the contemplation of that contract (page
409). The court also discussed the distinctions between
a mining partnership and an ordinary commercial partnership. None of these distinctions is significant in the
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or in the case at bar and there is no rule
that a mining partnership is more easily fonned or is
fon11Pd again~t the plainly expressed intention of the
part iPl" any more than is a ~ommercial or trading partIIPI'ship. \\'<' still have to read the contract and deterrnillP ib intent. The court explained the fact of Brossard's doing the work on the theory that he was made
the general manger by the partners, and it was proper
for a gPneral manager to take control of the operations.
Specificall~· the differences between that case and
the case at bar are that the contributors in the Bentley
case wPre necessarily committed to the contract requiring
development of the mine and nothing in the sublease
negatived the implications of full responsibility for
carrying out that contract. In our case there is no
obligation of development outside the Joint Operating
Agreement. This agreement specifically negatives the
joint responsibility for 1nutual operation as to this well.
Cross-Appellants were investors in oil and gas
leases. They wanted to be sure a well was drilled on the
property in which they were acquiring an interest. This
is a con1mon practice and a normal approach which a
prospective investor would take in connection with purchase of an undivided interest in an oil well. The growth
of oil exploration in Utah gives this case more significance than it would have had ten years ago. It is not
ordinarily the intention of investors to become partners
with well drillers, nor is it the expectation of suppliers
to hold interest holders responsible for materials furnished to well-drillers.
flt·ullt'.'l <'Use
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In accordance with the intention of tlw partieH and
the agreement which was carefully prepared to guard
against this \'ery liability, this court should hold that
no mining partnership a ro~e under the joint operating
agreement.

~-\_ppellants

were doing busines~ in rtah by causing
interstate commerce in their products to end at the
Vernal warehouse, by incorporating their products in
their r tah business and making local sales in substantial
quantity to all who came for the products. The original
package doctrine should not be given any such absolute
effect as to create a barrier to control where none in fact
exi~ts.

;. ~:
~

.

The Joint Operating Agreement between the parties
guards against sharing of losses by Cross-Appellants
which is significant in determining whether a partnership was intended to arise. The lack of practicable control over the drilling operation is further evidence that
the incidents of a partnership did not exist and that no
partnership was intended. To argue otherwise is to contend that the essentials incidental to a partnership which
were carefully excluded by the agreement will now be
made a part of the agreement by force of law. This would
not only ignore the intention of the parties but destroy
their power to contract. There has been no holding out
of partnership, no representation of any kind and no
reliance by Appellants on the existence of a partnership
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or on the <'l'Pdi t of'

Cros~:~-Appellants.

There is no reason
to diHn•!-!;ard the corporate entity and the Court should
hold the finding as to that erroneous and prejudicial
and, eitlwr grant a new trial, or direct that the judgment
be vacated and judgment of no cause of action entered.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS AND BIRD AND
DAN S. BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Respondents
and Cross Ap([Jellamts.
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